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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Grimm's January 23, 2011 email to DxNA was a written "demand" as required
under Utah Code§ 34-28-S(l)(b). Grimm's email listed the items he claimed were owed
by DxNA, informed DxNA that he wanted to be paid, let DxNA know that Section 3428-5(1 }(b) required payment of his wages within 24 hours, and made a settlement offer to
resolve his claim for wages and other compensation. From Grimm's email, DxNA
understood that Grimm wanted to be paid unpaid payroll and other compensation for
specified time periods that he worked for Ox.NA but was not paid, and its February 14th
letter to Grimm acknowledged that fact. DxNA cannot dispute that Grimm's email was
sufficient to put it on notice of his desire to be paid and his proposed method for paying
that obligation. The statutory language of Section 34-28-S(l)(b) does not impose any
heightened, detailed or specific requirements on what qualifies as a demand, but under
any of the definitions of demand, Grimm's January 23nt email unquestionably satisfies
those requirements. Simply, DxNA refused to act after receiving Grimm's demand and is
liable for the statutory penalty. The trial court's refusal to award Grimm the statutory
penalty was erroneous.
For the same reasons, the trial court improperly rejected Grimm's claim to
attorney fees under Utah Code § 34-27-1. Grimm's January 23 rd email was a written
demand under Section 34-27-1. Further, Grimm recovered an the wages he demanded.
While a party is not entitled to attorney fees if his ultimate award is less than the amounts
claimed in the deman·d, the appropriate inquiry is the amount of unpaid wages demanded
and recovered, not all claims or forms of compensation demanded and recovered.
I
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Further, even if Section 34-27-1 applies to all forms of compensation arising out of the
employment relationship, in addition to wages, it is premature for the Court to rule that
Grimm failed to recover less than he demanded in writing. This detennination should be

reserved for the trial court after all other issues related to this appeal are resolved.
Lastly, the trial court's complete disregard of and refusal to apply Grimm's

employment agreement as it related to accrued vacation in 2008 and 2009 was in error.
The trial court erred in its interpretation of Section 2.2 of the employment agreement and
its award of accrued vacation to Grimm for 2008 and 2009. The trial court expressly
determined that Grimm could accrue and be paid out unused vacation for 2010, under
DxNA's "normal payroll practices" as applied to Grimm. It awarded him 12 unused days
in 2010. Having done so, it was obligated to do the same analysis for 2008 and 2009, not
simply punt away the issue and find that awarding unused vacation for 2008 and 2009 to
Grimm was "unreasonable." Whether DxNA's "pay practices" in DxNA's employee
handbook as applied to rank-and-file employees applied to Grimm or other policies
applied to Grimm is not relevant. The trial court determined Grimm was entitled to
accrual under the employment agreement in 2010. Having done so, it was required to
award Grimm accrual of unused vacation in 2008 and 2009 as well, apply the terms of
the employment agreement and its determination ofDxNA's normal payroll practices to
Grimm for each of those years.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vJ

ARGUMENT

I.

Grimm's January 23, 2011 email was a written demand under Utah Code
§ 34-28-S(l)(b)(i).
DxNA argues that Grimm isn't entitled to a statutory penalty equal to sixty-

days of his wages under Section 34-28-S(l)(b)(i) because it claims- as the trial court did

-that Grimm's January 23,2011 email was merely a "proposal" and not the type of
written "demand" contemplated by the Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA). (DxNA
Br., p. 13-14). DxNA also attempts to gamer sympathy from this Court by ignoring its
willful and deliberate violation of the UPWA and unlawful retention of Grimm's wages
for years, and instead focusing on purported deficiencies in Grimm's written demand that
were the cause of its failure to pay wages within 24 hours. (DxNA Br., p. 15-17). The
Court should not be misled by this tactic. Simply, DxNA - and the trial cowt - add
requirements to the statutory language set forth in Utah Code §34-28-S(l)(b) that simply
do not exist.
Section 34-28-5(1 )(b)(i) requires nothing more of Grimm than a simple, written
demand. (Id.). The statutory language omits any itemization outlining what must be
included in a written demand. (Id.). The statute's plain and unambiguous language does
not require a cogent written demand, or mandate that that the demand include a request to
be paid in 24 hours (or within any timeframe), as DxNA repeatedly suggests. (Id.). There
is no requirement anywhere in the statutory language that Grimm's demand be accurate
or supported by certain types of documentation or language to be valid. The statute
3
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doesn't mandate that Grimm demand the full amount he claims, or less than the full
amount he claims is owed. (Id.). And, significantly, there is no requirement that Grimm
avoid making an offer to settle his claim, or otherwise offer to an employer that it can pay
amounts due to him over time. (Id).
In its brief, DxNA suggests that a written demand "must be something the
employer is capable of verifying and paying within 24 hours" and that Grimm's January
23rd email was "not something DxNA could justifiably pay within 24 hours." (Dx.~A Br.,

p. 15). DxNA is wrong. First, the statute says nothing of the sort. There is no
requirement to request payment immediately, within 24 hours or within any specified
timeframe. Second, Grimm's demand for wages, as explained below, was verified and
understood by DxNA, as shown by its letter dated February 14, 2011. (Pl. Ex. 20).

DxN A does not challenge or dispute the ordinary or plain meaning of the word
"demand," or its legal meaning, as set forth in Grimm's cross-appeal. (DxNA Br., p. 14).
Under any of the definitions of "demand" used by Grimm or DxNA, Grimm's January
23n1 email is unquestionably a demand.
To reiterate, follo\\ing Grimm's meeting with Jennings and Gubler after his
termination, on January 23, 2011 Grimm sent an email to Jennings (Pl. Ex. 17) telling
~

Jennings he was "e-mailing [him] a reconciliation of amounts owed and created
through my layoff." (emphasis supplied) (R. 2406; Pl. Ex. 17, p. 1). Grimm's January 23,

2011 email was accompanied by three attachments, two of which included a spreadsheet
with the heading "DxNA amounts Due" with separate columns for a) unreimbursed

business expenses; b) past due payroll (wages); c) accrued but unpaid PTO; and d)
4
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severance. (Pl. Ex. 17, p. 3-5, 6-8; R. 2411-16). Any reasonable employer would have
known - as DxNA did- that Grimm wanted to be paid the four categories of compensation
highlighted by Grimm.
With respect to the past due payro11, Grimm's attachment showed each payroll

date that Grimm had not been paid, and the amounts he had not been paid, including the
totals for each period. (Id.). Grimm further told Ox.NA that "Utah State law requires
vi)

settlement of amounts owed within 24 hours of termination of employment." (Id.). In
other words, he told DxNA the law requires that DxNA pay him the amounts he was
claiming within 24 hours. He put them on notice about the law, but nothing in the statute
required him to do so. But because Grimm knew the current financial condition of
DxNA, he candidly acknowledged that forcing DxNA to make immediate payment of all

Vii

amounts due to him "could cause immediate financial challenges" for DxNA. (Id.).
Considering this fact, Grimm's email proposed that DxNA could pay the amounts due to
him over time, provided that the payments were secured and included interest, to "find an
acceptable means of getting this balance paid.'' (Pl. Ex. 17).
In short, Grimm's email makes clear he is due wages. He says he is owed wages

~

through his termination, and seeks relief from DxNA. He is claiming, asking, requesting
and asserting an entitlement to certain compen~on and proposing methods for DxNA to
pay the compensation he is owed. That is sufficient.

~

Tellingly, DxNA's brief doesn't say one word about Dx.NA's response to Grimm's
January 23 rd email. (DxNA Br., p. 13-16). This is because DxNA's response is conclusive
as to the issue of whether Grimm's email was a sufficient written demand under Section

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34-28-S(l)(b) to trigger the civil penalty. After DxNA received Grimm's email, and
DxNA exchanged numerous follow-up emails with Grimm (Def. Ex. 56-60), Ox.NA
responded to Grimm by letter dated February 14, 2011 from its legal counsel. (Pl. Ex.
20). The letter stated the following:
"We are responding herein on behalf of our client Dx..."'IA, LLC
(the ••company") to your correspondence to the Company setting
forth your requests for compensation in connection with the
tennination of your employment by the Company. You callfor compensation
payments in four specific areas."
(emphasis given) (Pl. Ex. 20, p. 1). As to Grimm's specific "requests" to be paid his past
due wages, Dx.:."'lA's letter acknowledged that Grimm's January 23n:t email "requests total

unpaid payroll of nearly $100,000 in the form of a single payment and ten full payments
of salary between August 8, 2010 and January 23, 2011." (Id.) (emphasis prO\•ided).
By its own admission, DL~A knew Grimm was "requesting" to be paid money
owed to him, including unpaid payroll. It knew the law required payment in 24 hours,
because Grimm told it so. It even retained cowisel to specifically respond to Grimm's
demand. DxNA told Grimm on February 14th that it would pay all wages it believed were
due to Grimm, but determined no wages were owed to him at that time. Grimm's email
not on1yput DxNA on notice of the exact amount of unpaid payro11 he was seeking, it
also put DxNA on notice of the exact time periods during which Grimm claimed the
payroll liability accrued. Armed with that knowledge, DxNA willfully and knowingly
failed to pay Grimm any of the wages he was owed.
DxNA's February 14th letter to Grimm didn't ask Grimm to provide any specific
information about wages he was owed. Rather, it knew Grimm had demanded payment
6
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of wages and was carefully considering its response to his demand, as it outlined in the
February 14th letter:
The Company is reviewing the time periods for which you
request payroll compensation against records received from
the State of Utah and payments made to you from the Company
during that time to determine times during which you did not
receive compensation from the Company or unemployment
compensation from the State, but were performing services on
behalf of the Company. The Company intends to make full payment
of any unpaid slllary if it is determined that any such salary is
owed but, so far as we have been able to determine, no additional
salary is owed.
{Pl. Ex. 20) (emphasis supplied). 1 In short, Ox.NA had all the information it needed It

admitted it didn't need anything more from Grimm to evaluate his wage claim. It knew
Grimm wanted his wages, and it knew the period of times he claimed the wages were due
to him. DxNA even said it would make full payment of any wages it determined it owed.
When it did not, Grimm sued.
Once Grimm told Ox.NA in writing he was owed money and wanted to be paid,
the statute triggered DxNA 's obligation to determine what, if anything, it was going to
pay, or to face severe penalties for its failure to do so. See Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc.,

1

vJ

DxNA attempts to claim that Grimm later indicated by email that his January 23, 2011
email was not a demand, by referencing an email sent by Grimm to Jennings that stated
he "did not consider [his settlement proposal] a list of demands, rather a suggestion ..."
(Def. Ex. 57). As with DxNA's letter to Grimm, DxNA carefully omits any reference to
other emails in the record (Def. Ex. 58, 59 and 60) that related to this email and that make
clear Grimm was demanding to be paid. In any event, a clear reading of Grimm's email
makes clear that he was saying he was willing to negotiate how he could be paid back,
and that he was open to alternative proposals from DxNA. But nothing in the email
indicates that he was no longer demanding to be paid what he believed he was entitled to.
Again, DxNA's February 14m letter shows that it understood what Grimm was
demanding. (Pl. Ex. 20).
7
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2015 UT 75, f 25 (noting that even an employer who withholds and fails to pay wages in
good faith who is later deemed to not have paid wages that were owed "would still be
subject to criminal liability for 'fail[ing] to comply \\ith' a provision of the UPWA.")

(citing Utah Code Ann. § 34- 28-12). Faced with this choice, DxNA willfully refused to
pay Grimm wages it knew be had not be paid and should be punished in accordance with
the UPWA for this blatant and knowing failure.

In sum, Grimm's email was a written demand and ThL~A responded to that
demand by failing to pay Grimm any wages. The trial court committed err in finding that
Grimm is not entitled to the statutory penalty. Accordingly, this Court should reverse and
remand to the trial court to determine the amount of additional wages Grimm is owed as a
statutory civil penalty under Section 34-28-S(l)(b} for Thu~A's failure to timely pay
Grimm his wages.

n.

~

Grimm's January 23rd email was a written demand under Section 34-27-1
and be recovered aU the unpaid wages that were earned and due that he
demanded from DXl~A.
DxNA makes two arguments in support of the trial court's refusal to award

attorney fees to Grimm arising from his wage claim. First, it claims Grimm did not make
a proper written demand under Section 34-27-1 for the same reasons his written demand
was not proper under Section 34-28-5. Second, it claims that Grimm's demand was
more than the amount of the judgment he later obtained. See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1.

Each argument is addressed and dismissed below.
First, for the same reasons as set forth above with reference to Section 34-28-5,
Grimm's January 23 rd email is a written demand to be paid wages owed to him. Because
8
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both statutes require a written demand and both statutes do not define the term demand,
each statute should be interpreted in accordance with common and ordinary meaning of
demand, as we noted in our opening brief. When reviewed in this light, Grimm's January
23 rd email is properly considered a written demand under Section 34-28-5 and 34-27-1.
Second, Grimm recovered all the wages he sought in this action. (Pl. Ex. 17; R
1052-54). This fact is undisputed by DxNA in its brief. Because he recovered all the
wages he demanded, he is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
DxNA attempts to side-step this issue by suggesting that the proper analysis is to
vJ

review the total recovery by Grimm on all categories of compensation he recovered in his
judgment to all categories of compensation he demanded in his January 23 rd email.
(DxNA Br., p. 17). This analysis of Section 34-27-1 is incorrect. See Francis v. National

vi>

DME, 2015 UT App 119, ,r 37 ("Using this plain meaning approach, we conclude that
section 34-27-1 requires a demand for unpaid wages not to exceed the ultimate judgment.
In other words, recovery of attorney fees is authorized only when the employee has

obtained a judgment in an amount equivalent to or higher than the amount he or she
sought to recover.")
As the Court of Appeals noted in Francis, Section 34-21.. 1 is concerned solely

with the award of attorney fees for the recovery of wages "due and owing" for the
performance of labor or services. While Section 34-27-1 does not define the term
"wages," as noted in Grimm's opening brief, wages are defined under the UPWA as "the
amounts due the employee for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such
vJ

9
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amount" Sec Utah Code 34-28-2(1)(e) (2011). This definition is consistent with the
ordinary and commonly understood meaning of wages - the rate of pay (whether piece
meal, per hour, or salary) someone is paid to perform work, not other items in addition to

wages (e.g., stock, severance, benefits, etc.) an employee might receive.
Section 34-27-1 speaks of attorney fees recoverable for wages that are "earned and
due." In other words, it is focused solely on wages that are payable because work has
been performed. In this case, Grimm had a set salary of $250,000 per year, paid out in
accordance with DxNA 's normal payroll practices. (Pl. Ex. 1; R. 2334; R. 2346-47). That
salary is what constitutes his wage, not any stock, benefits or other remuneration he

might be entitled to, including severance, arising out of his employment. And, as noted in
Grimm's opening brief, the award of attorney fees "turns upon success as to those
elements, not upon a determination that a party prevailed in general or on the main

issue." Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Utah 1997) (emphasis
supplied). Hence, whether Grimm recovered all items of damages he demanded for
accrued PTO, severance or for any other separate category of damages is irrelevant to the
determination of his entitlement to attorney fees.
The trial court determined Grimm was terminated on January 21, 2011. (R. 940, ~
55, 59; R. 955, mf2-3). It also determined Grimm filed this lawsuit within 59 days of his
termination on January 21, 2011. (R. l; R 960, ~ 3; R.943, ,i 73). After considering all
the evidence, it determined Grimm was owed wages, all those wages were due and not
paid to him by DxNA, and awarded him the full amount of wages he sought in this action
($99,866.47). (R. 943, ,r 73, R. 957, ,i 4). This is the exact amount Grimm demanded {Pl.
10
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~

Ex. 17) and DxNA acknowledged he had demanded (Pl. Ex. 20) more than fifteen days
prior to suit.
Lastly, even if wages under Section 34-27-1 can be construed to include all fonns
of compensation arising from the employment relationship, it is still premature to
determine whether Grimm's ultimate judgment exceeded what he demanded. To the
extent the Court determines Grimm's January 23, 2011 email was a written demand for
purposes of Section 34-27-1, it should remand the case back to the trial court to
determine what, if any, amount of attorney fees is due Grimm based upon the ultimate
~

judgment entered in this case, which may include additional amounts for a statutory
penalty and accrued vacation that was not awarded for 2008 and 2009. 2
In sum, the trial court's ruling that Grimm did not submit a written demand to

vJ

DxNA under Section 34-27-1 was in err. Grimm recovered all the wages he demanded
and sought in this action and thus is entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in
pursuing his wage claim.
DL

The trial court's determination that Grimm's recovery of accrued
vacation for 2008 and 2009 was "unreasonable" was in error.

DxNA argues that the trial court correctly limited Grimm's recovery under the
employment agreement to 12 days of vacation for 20 l 0 because Section 2.2 of the
employment agreement expressly references accrual of vacation "in conformity with the

2

DxNA acknowledges that the judgment obtained by Grimm, $406,381.59, plus a 2%
membership interest in DxNA was greater than any amount demanded by the Grimm in
his January 23 rd email ($364,544.25). If all forms of compensation are included in
determining the amount demanded, then all forms of recovery should be included in
determining whether attorney fees are awarded under Section 34-27-1.
11
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Employer's normal payroll practices," the phrase "normal payroll practices" is
ambiguous, which allowed the Court to look to extrinsic evidence, and Grimm "never
established that any policy of accrual and carryover applied to him as DxNA's CEO."
(DxNA Br., p. 2~).
Recognizing the clear error committed by the trial court, DxNA labors on and on
in its brief citing to inapplicable sections of the trial court's findings regarding DxNA's
policies and handbook in an effort to tease out a rationale that could support the trial
court's determination that allowing Grimm to recover accrued but unused vacation for
2008 and 2009 was simply "unreasonable." (DxNA Br., p. 18-21).
The issue before this Court is much simpler than what DxNA suggests in its brief.
After the trial court considered all the evidence on the issue of D,u~A' s payroll accrual
practices, it awarded Grimm 12 days of vacation that had accrued in 2010 under the
terms of Section 2.2 of this employment agreement. Specifically, the trial court
determined that Section 2.2 of Grimm's employment agreement allowed him to accrue
unused vacation days and to be paid out unused vacation days. Based upon Grimm's
testimony, it awarded him 12 days of vacation pay for 2010, in accordance \\ith DxNA' s
normal payroll practices. (R. 958). Necessarily, however, in order to make that decision,
the trial court had to determine what the "normal pa)'Toll practice" was for Grimm to be

able to accrue any unused vacation for the prior year.
Despite finding that the employment agreement entitled Grimm to accrue vacation
in 2010, no award or determination was made concerning the amount of days Grimm had
accrued in 2008 or 2009. Instead of determining what amount, if any, of accrued vacation
12
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Grimm could carry over from 2008 and 2009, the trial court simply determined that
"accrual beyond [2010] is unreasonable." (R. 958). Specifically, the court exercised "its
latitude and discretion to impose a reasonable interpretation." (R. 958). That

interp1etation was simply that allowing "accrual of PTO beyond [2010] is not
reasonable."
If the court found that Grimm could accrue vacation in 20 IO and be entitled to be
vi)

paid out that vacation after his termination, the same entitlement would necessarily exist
for 2008 and 2009. DxNA attempts to make a distinction about accruing and carrying
over, but that distinction is irrelevant given the trial court's decision to pay Grimm
accrued vacation under the employment agreement for 2010. And that decision is in
direct conflict with the language of Section 2.2 of the employment agreement as a matter
of law.
The trial court cannot read Section 2.2. to allow Grimm to accrue vacation in
2010, but not accrue it under the employment agreement in 2008 and 2009. Even if the

trial court determined that the employee handbook did not apply to Grimm, that the
policies and procedures with respect to accrual and carryover of PTO were confusing, it
still determined that he could accrue and be paid out vacation time for 2010. Having
made that ruling, it was required to determined what vacation Grimm did not use in
Simply, the Court found the employment agreement allowed Grimm to accrue
vj

vacation days dwing the employment term. It awarded him pay for unused vacation days
in 2010, but not 2008 and 2009. This ruling misinterpreted the employment agreement

13
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and is in error. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
how many vacation days Grimm accrued in 2008 and 2009 that he did not use.
COSCLUSION

The trial court's determination that Grimm was not entitled to a statutory penalty

~

or attorney fees because he did not submit a proper written demand is in error. Similarly,
the trial court's interpretation of the emplo)ment agreement to exclude other vacation
earned and accrued by Grimm in 2008 and 2009 is in error. Accordingly, this Court
should remand this case to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of vacation
for 2008-2009 that Grimm accrued, the amount of statutory penalty owed to him, and
what attorney fees he is entitled to recover.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I~ day of July, 2017
~

STAVROS LAW P.C.
Attorneys for Appel/ee and Cross-Appellant
Phillip Grimm
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